, Werner and Werner (1969) , and Pitts (1970) . And second, I discovered two more or less interrelated areas of confusion and ambiguity that run through the literature on simulation. One area of ambiguity concerns the aim or purpose of computer simulations and leads to confusion about what benefits -if any -can be derived from building or running computer models. The second area of ambiguity refers to the logical character of simulations and results in confusion about the relationships between computer models and &dquo;reality&dquo;. In view of these considerations I decided not to write yet another review article, but instead to try to contribute to the clarification of these ambiguities. This paper, then, will focus on the interrelated problems of the purpose of simulation and their logical character.
The purpose of simulation .
Although it is generally agreed that all simulations have certain elements in common, various writers have distinguished kinds of simulations. Abelson (1968) , Cohen and Cyert (1965) , Dawson (1962) , Fattu (1965) Thus, we may define a set of isomorphic structures some of which may be empirical and some of which may be abstract. Within this set, an abstract structure -if one is specified -is called a mathematical model or representation of each of the empirical structures it models. And again, if an abstract structure is specified, each empirical structure in the set is an empirical model or interpretation of it. Moreover, given two or more empirical structures in the set, each is a simulation of the others. This, then, defines simulation ; it is an isomorphic relation between two or more empirical structures.
Note that both modelling and simulation as they are used here are symmetrical relations. Often, however, they are defined as asymmetrical. It is likely that the asymmetry of the usual concept of model is primarily pragmatic. Mathematicians, whose main concern is with the development of abstract structures, sometimes seek empirical models simply to The computer run seems, at best, but a shadowy approximation of that reality. What is forgotten is that the programmed computer is not a simulation of the total human being, it is simply an empirical structure that is isomorphic, not with the entire human, but with another empirical structure : certain specified elements of human behavior in a particular learning task. Thus, the structure of the programmed computer is no less real or tangible than structure of the human learner as an empirical abstraction ; both are abstraction from &dquo;reality&dquo; and each simulates the other.
&dquo;Reality&dquo; as such has no place in this scheme -the empirical structures are either isomorphic in defined relevant respects or they are not. There is, however, an area of confusion underlying the idea that special tests are needed to fit simulations with reality (Ulam, 1967 
